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Fulton County Superior Court
***EFILED***QW
Date: 6/17/2021 10:38 AM
Cathelene Robinson, Clerk

BERNARD H. BRONNER,
derivatively on behalf of Rainforest
Production Holdings, Inc. and
directly on behalf of himself,
Plaintiff,
v.
ROBERTE. HARDY,II,
WILLIAM E. PACKER,JR. and
TRF PRODUCTIONS, LLC,
Individual Defendants,
and

RAINFOREST PRODUCTION
HOLDINGS, INC.
Nominal Defendant.
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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF FULTON COUNTY
BUSINESS CASE DIVISION
STATE OF GEORGIA

Civil Action File No.
2014CV248023

Bus. Case Div. 3

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR LEAVE
TO FILE HIS THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT
This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiff's Motion for Leaveto File his
Third Amended Complaint, filed May 6, 2021 (“Motion”). Having reviewed the
record and considered the written arguments and submissions of counsel, the Court
enters the following order.

1. INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff seeks leave to amendhis breach of contract claim to add a derivative
breach ofcontract claim against two defendants and a direct breach of contract claim
against another defendant.

Defendants argue the delay in bringing such an

amendment is both prejudicial and unexcusable such that leave should not be
granted.
2. BACKGROUND
2.1 General History and the Initial Round ofSummary Judgment Motions
This matter concerns a long-standing fight among formerbusiness partners in
a film production business, Rainforest Production Holdings, Inc. (“Rainforest”).

Plaintiff Bernard H. Bronnerinvested in the business. It was founded and primarily
operated by individual Defendants Robert E. Hardy, II and William E. Packer, Jr.
(sometimes referred to as “Founders”). In October of 2010, Bronner, Hardy, Packer,

and Rainforest signed a Reconciliation Agreementto resolve various differences that
had arisen in the business relationship (“Reconciliation Agreement”). It outlined

certain financial obligations and reporting requirements.
The Reconciliation Agreement has been a sticking point in the litigation as
the Plaintiff's arguments aboutthis contract have shifted twice, both in response to
adverse court rulings. Throughout the early phasesof the case, Plaintiff argued the

Reconciliation Agreement was unenforceable and soughtrelief for the Defendants’

alleged breach of an earlier Subscription Agreement. Rainforest Prod. Holdings,
Inc. v. Bronner, Nos. A19A1684, A19A2157 (Ga. App., Mar. 4, 2020), pp. 14-16.
Bycontrast, Defendants asserted the Reconciliation Agreement wasenforceable and
filed a counterclaim forits breach. (Counterclaim, J§ 23-36, 40, 58-63.) In ruling
on the first round of summary judgment motions, this Court agreed with Defendants
that the Reconciliation Agreement wasenforceable and that any breach claim under
the Subscription Agreement wasbarred byits release languageas well asthe statute
of limitations.

Rainforest Prod., at 15-16, 30-32.

However, this Court further

determined that a jury question remained as to whether Defendants breached the
Reconciliation Agreement and thus denied Defendants’ motion for summary
judgmenton the breach of contract claim. Id. at 16-18.
In reviewing the decision, the Court of Appeals found this Court, “erred in
transformingPlaintiffs breach of contract claim — expressly raised in the complaint
against [Defendant TRF Productions, LLC] for violations of the Subscription
Agreement — to include claims against Hardy and Packer for violations of the
Reconciliation Agreement.” Id., at 17-18. Accordingly, the appellate court reversed
the denial of summary judgmentfor breach of the Subscription Agreement. Id., at
18.
The judgmentorder on the appellate remittitur was entered on May 1, 2020.

After the remittitur, the only remaining claimsin the action werePlaintiff's claims

against Hardy and Packer for breach offiduciary duty and waste/missappropriation
of corporate assets as well as Defendants’ claims for breach of the Reconciliation
Agreement’s non-disparagementclause. (Cons. Pre-Trial Ord., § 8.)
2.2 The Second Amended Complaint and the Second Round of
Summary Judgment Motions regarding Financial Provisions of the
Reconciliation Agreement
On October 21, 2020, Plaintiffs filed their Second Amended Complaint. The

only new claim found in the Second Amended Claim was Plaintiff's direct claim
against Hardy and Packer for breach of the Reconciliation Agreement. (Order on

Cross Mots. for Summ. J., pp. 16-17.)
The Reconciliation Agreement expressly stated Hardy and Packer were
“primarily responsible for and actively involved in the management and oversight
of the day-to-day operations and affairs of [Rainforest] and its affiliates...
(Reconciliation Agreement, Recitals, 4.)

”

Article II of the Reconciliation

Agreement addressedfinancial and compensation issues. Section 2.1 provides,
[Rainforest] shall continue to use Rainforest Filmsor another operating
entity of or controlled by [Rainforest] to engagein all Core Business
Projects in which either of the Founders receives any compensation or
other paymentforhis services as a result of such Core Business Project.
No compensation or other payment may be made to either of the
Founders on account of any service performed by a Founder with
respect to any Core Business Project, except as provided in this
Agreementor unless such compensation or other payment is approved
by the Board of Directors ..

Packer for
Section 2.2 established base annual salaries of $175,000 for Hardy and
e would
their work on “Core Businessactivities.” Section 2.3 addressed how revenu
d
be shared with Rainforest on Core Business Projects where Hardy or Packer worke
s
individually, and 2.4 addressed revenue-sharing obligations for those sameproject
where the two Founders worked together.

Section 2.5 requires Rainforest to

would be
annually establish a year-end bonus pool (“Year-End Bonus Pool”) that
equally divided among Hardy, Packer and Bronner.
to
Section § 1.6 of the Reconciliation Agreementfurther required Rainforest
earned by
provide Bronner with a certain financial report accounting for revenues
the feature film Trois.
the
While Plaintiff sought leave to file this Second Amended Complaint,
.A. § 9-11Court determined leave was not necessary underthe clear terms of O.C.G
entry ofa pre15(a) which allows a party to freely amend theirpleadingspriorto the
er 29, 2020, p.
trial order. (Order on Mots. re: Second Am. Compl., entered Octob
on the newly
3.) Defendants sought the opportunity to file a dispositive motion
set forth a briefing
framed contract claim, and, on November 18, 2020, the Court

schedule for Defendants’ anticipated motion.

That same day, the Court entered a

to amend their
Consolidated Pre-Trial Order, ending the ability of the parties

pleadings without permission of the Court.

of
The parties filed motions seeking summary judgment on the new breach
Cross Motions
contract claim, and on April 26, 2021, the Court entered an Order on

ry
for Partial Summary Judgment, granting Defendants’ motion and entering summa
contract
judgment in favor of Defendants on Plaintiff's newly asserted breach of
below.
claim. The portionsofthat orderpertinent to the present Motionare detailed
2.2.1 Reconciliation Agreement, § 2.2-2.4 / Compensation
on
Plaintiff claimed Hardy and Packerunilaterally abandoned the compensati
to pursue
structure outlined in Article II of the Reconciliation Agreement
benefit.
independent projects and diverted Rainforest opportunities for their own
unities
The Court found any recovery for Rainforest’s lost revenues and opport
Bronner, and
would inure to the benefit of all Rainforest shareholders, not just

granted on
should be pursued derivatively. Accordingly, summary judgment was
the direct claim. (Order on Cross Mots. for Summ. J., p. 30.)
2.2.2 Reconciliation Agreement, § 2.5 / Year-End Bonus Pool
ined
With regard to § 2.5 of the Reconciliation Agreement, the Court determ
ed only him,

Bronnercould pursue a direct claim as the Year-End Bonus Poolbenefit

by other
Hardy and Packer such that Bronner suffered a special injury not borne
d as to the
shareholders. (Id.) The Court also determined a question of fact existe
finding that
breach, noting “the Court of Appeals has adopted this Court’s prior
ants
material questions of fact exist as to the circumstances whereby Defend

abandoned the Reconciliation Agreement’s compensation structure.” (Id. at 25.)
However, summary judgment was granted becausethe Reconciliation Agreement
placed the Year-End Bonus Pool obligation on Rainforest, not Hardy or Packer
individually. (Id. at 31-33.)
2.2.3 Reconciliation Agreement § 1.6 / Trois Financial Report
Reconciliation Agreement § 1.6 required Rainforest to provide Plaintiff a
report, “setting forth in reasonable detail the financial results of the feature film
Trois, whichreport shall be prepared consistent with prevailing financial accounting
practices in the feature film industry.” In its recent ruling, the Court found that this
claim could be pursued directly by Bronner because, construing the record in the
light most favorable to him, he suffered an injury separate and distinct from other
shareholders (Id. at 29.) Applying that same standard, the Court found disputed
evidence of a breachsuchthatthe question should be resolved bythefactfinder.(Id.
at 23-25.) Again, however, the Court granted summary judgment, finding that the
claim was improperly directed at Packer and Hardy, notat Rainforest, the party
expressly obligated to provide the report underthe Reconciliation Agreement. (Id.
at 31-33.)
2.3 The Motion Seeking Leave to File a Third Amended Complaint
On May6, 2021, ten daysafter the Court enteredits orderon the cross motions
for summary judgment, Bronnerfiled the present Motion. He is seeking leave under

O.C.G.A. § 9-11-15(a) to file a Third Amended Complaint with the aim of
“align[ing] his claims with this Court’s most recent pronouncements.” (Motion, p.
2.) The only “new” claims contained within the Third Amended Complaint are
direct claims against Rainforest, rather than Hardy and Packer, for breach of §§ 1.6
and 2.5 of the Reconciliation Agreement andderivative, not direct, claims against

Hardy and Packer for breach of §§ 2.2-2.4 of the Reconciliation Agreement.
(Motion, Ex. E, JJ 82-86, 99-102.)

Hardy, Packer and Rainforest filed their

objection to the Motion on June 4, 2021.

3. STANDARD OF REVIEW
3.1.

The General Standard of Review for Motions to Amend
Pleadings after the Entry ofa Pre-Trial Order

Afterthe entry of a pre-trial order, O.C.G.A. § 9-11-15(a) provides a “party
may amendhis pleading only by leave of court or by written consentof the adverse
party. Leaveshall be freely given whenjustice so requires.” O.C.G.A. § 9-11-15(a)
“is to be liberally construed in favorof allowance of amendments, particularly when
the opposing party is not prejudiced thereby. Like the right of amendment, the
discretion of the trial court in controlling it is very broad. Determinations ofthetrial
court in this regard will not be disturbed absent a manifest abuse of discretion.”
Glynn-Brunswick Mem’! Hosp. Auth. v. Gibbons, 243 Ga. App. 341, 346 (2000).

3.2.

Considering Delay when Evaluating a Late-Filed Amendment

This Motion raises the question about how delay should be considered when
evaluating prejudice to the party defending against the late-filed amendment under
O.C.G.A. § 9-11-15(a).

The interplay of delay and prejudice was thoroughly

addressed in Total Car Franchising Corp. v. Squire, 259 Ga. App. 114 (2003) where
a trial court denied plaintiff leave to amend solely because the case had been
scheduled for trial and had appeared onpriortrial calendarsat the time leave was
sought.

In reviewing the trial court’s decision, the Court of Appeals began by

focusing on the rationale behindpre-trial orders. “The purpose of the pretrial order
is to formulate and simplify the issues for trial, but these objectives should not
operate contrary to the spirit of the Civil Practice Act whichis to ensure that cases
be decided on their merits and that decisions based on other considerations be
avoided.” Id. at 116 (Citation and punctuation omitted). The Court of Appeals also
noted Georgia’s history ofliberally allowing the amendmentofpre-trial orders. Id.
With that rationale in mind, the appellate court then considered how a court
should evaluate late attempts to modify a pre-trial order.
Generally, a proposed amendmentwill not be barred because it is offeredlate
in the case so long as the otherparty is not prejudiced. The burdenis on the
party seeking amendmentto showlack oflaches or lack of unexcusable delay.
When exercising discretion to allow or disallow amendments, the trial court
must balance possible unfair prejudice to the nonmoving party with the
movant’s reasons for delay. But mere delay in seeking leave to amendis not
a sufficient reason for its denial.

Id. (Citations and punctuation omitted).
4.

ANALYSIS
4.1

The Parties’ Contentions

Bronner contends the amended complaint would not prejudice the
Defendants. He contends thefacts at the heart of the most recent amendmentare not
new and wereclearly alleged in the initial complaint — the failure to provide Trois
Accounting,failure to report Rainforest revenue, and the improper compensation the
individual Defendants paid to themselves. (Ver. Compl., {{] 43-64, 94-95.) While
Plaintiff's initial complaint did not seek recovery under the Reconciliation
Agreement, Defendants immediately put the agreement in issue with their
counterclaim, so it has been part of the litigation almost since its inception.
(Counterclaim, {J 23-36, 40, 54-55, 58-63.) The appellate opinion noted Defendants
“acknowledgedthat Plaintiff had made allegations concerning their fulfillment of
the terms of the Reconciliation Agreement . . .” dating back to Bronner’s January
26, 2017 deposition.

Rainforest Prod., at 16-17. Accordingly, Bronner concludes

nothing about the claimsasserted in the amended complaint should take Defendants
by surprise or impedetheirability to defend these new claims.
Defendants oppose the Motion, arguing they will be prejudiced ifthe amended
claim is allowed to proceed because they have not had the opportunity to perform
discovery and because this new amendment would addto the prejudice they have

experienced defendingPlaintiff's “litany of meritless claims.” (Response,pp. 9-10.)
Theyalso assert Bronnerfailed to meet his burden ofestablishing a lack of laches or
unexcusable delay. (Id. at pp. 7-8.) In this same vein, Defendants argue there has
been no new evidenceortheory that would explain Plaintiff's delay in offering these
amendments. (Id. at p. 11.)
4.2

Possibility ofPrejudice to the Defendants

Prejudiceis the first element to be addressedin the balancing test established
by Total Car Franchising.

As addressed in Glynn-Brunswick Mem’! Hosp.,

prejudice occurs whena party is “impairedin its ability to defend against the merits”
of anewly amended claim. Id. at 346.
Prejudice will often bar pleadings amendmentsthat are offered just as a trial
is beginning orhas already commenced. See generally Franzen v. Downtown Dev.
Auth. of Atlanta, 309 Ga. 411, 419-420 (2020) (evidence supported trial court’s
decision to not allow intervenor’s amended objections to a bond validation
proceeding that had already commenced); Ostroff v. Coyner, 187 Ga. App. 109,
111-113 (1988) (evidence supported trial court’s decision not to modify pre-trial
order as requested on the day oftrial which was three weeksafter the trial was
initially set to begin); Mulkey v. Gen. Motors Corp., 164 Ga. App. 752, 754 (1982)
(evidence supportedtrial court’s decision not to allow amendmentestablishing a

new causeofaction “one working daypriorto trial”) (physical precedentonly) rev’d

on other grounds, 251 Ga. 32 (1983); see also Harris v. Tutt, 306 Ga. App. 377

(2010) (evidence supportedtrial court’s decision that no prejudice was created by an
amendment offered during courseoftrial where defendants “had prior notice” ofthe
amendment). Because this matter has yetto receivea trial setting, the prejudicial
impactof the amendmentis lessclear.
Defendants claim they have been prejudiced by having to constantly respond
to Bronner’s evolving and “meritless” claims; however, they offer no case law to
support that this constitutes the type of prejudice contemplated by O.C.G.A. § 9-1115(a). (Response, p. 10.) To the extent that Defendants may have suffered damage
from having to defend meritless claimsinthis litigation, other remedies specifically
intendedto address that harm are available to Defendants, most notably O.C.G.A. §
9-15-14.
The most compelling argumentof prejudice offered by Defendants concerns
their inability to conduct discovery on these particular claimsas the initial breach of
contract claim filed by the Plaintiffs concerned the Subscription Agreement, not the
Reconciliation Agreement. (Response, pp. 9-11.) Accordingly, Defendants argue
their prior discovery efforts were directed by that focus. (Id.) However, Defendants
havefailed to identify with any specificity what discovery they lack.
The record reveals a great deal of discovery was performed concerning the

Trois accounting and whether Rainforest complied with its obligation to provide a

report “setting forth in reasonable detail the financial results of the feature film Trois,
which report shall be prepared consistent with prevailing accounting practicesin the
feature film industry.” (Reconciliation Agreement, § 1.6.) It is undisputed that
Defendants provided Plaintiff with a single-page financial report that, by
Defendants’ own admission, lacked some key information. (See generally Order on

Cross Mots. for Summ. J., p. 24.) However, it is also undisputed that Defendants
providedPlaintiff with open access to meet with the company accountantto discuss
Trois finances and that Plaintiff never objected to the information the accountant
provided and never asked for any further clarification. (Hardy Aff, { 38; Packer
Aff., § 37; Ballier Dep., pp. 55-62; Watson Dep. pp. 202-205, 209-211.) This
particular claim will turn on whether Rainforest substantially complied with its
obligation to provide Bronner with a reasonably detailed Trois financial report as
required by the Reconciliation Agreement. See TRST Atlanta, Inc. v. 1815 Exch.,
Inc., 220 Ga. App. 184, 187 (1996) (“substantial compliance with the termsof the
contractis sufficient”). The Court finds Defendants have been provided an adequate
opportunity to conduct discovery on this particular claim.
Asto the remaining breach claims concerning Article IT and the compensation
provisions of the Reconciliation Agreement, many of the same underlying facts also

support Plaintiffs corporate waste and breach offiduciary duty allegations which
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were lodged in the initial complaint.’ (Ver. Compl., J 55, 63, 93-94, 104(a)-(b).)

Indeed, during the most recent round of summary judgmentbriefing, Defendants
argued Plaintiffs claims for breach of the Reconciliation Agreement were
duplicative of his tort claims. Specifically, Defendants argued, “Bronner’s breach
of Reconciliation Agreement claim premised upon the alleged compensation
structure and financial report provisions is duplicative of the fiduciary duty and
corporate waste claims, and, thus, subject to summary judgment.” (Defs. Memo. in
Supp. of Summ. J., p. 19.) These tort claims received the benefit of an extensive
discovery period. Having recently taken the position Plaintiffs contract claims are

duplicative of his tort claims, Defendants’ current argument, that they would be

!

In his initial complaint, Bronneralleged,

[iJn 2010, [the Founders] took action to set their annualsalaries at $175,000.00 each. At
the same time, [the Founders] took additional actions to allow each to divert 50% of the
revenuereceived by [Rainforest] on certain projects within [Rainforest’s] core competency
(the “Diverted Business Opportunities”). Specifically, each agreed that the other could
provide certain services to third parties that were expressly within Rainforest’s core
business offering and directly divert 50% of such revenues to himself personally orto his
personally-owned holding company. . .
(Ver. Compl., J 55.)
Bronnerfurther alleged that Hardy and Packer,
changed their compensation during calendar year 2012 or 2013 without Mr. Bronner’s
Specifically, [the Founders] changed their
knowledge, consent or authorization.
for the Diverted Business Opportunities
made
payments
of
100%
that
so
compensation
now goto [the Founders]. As such, Rainforest wasnot permitted to retain any monies for
such Diverted Business Opportunities. (Emphasis found in original.)
(Ver. Compl., { 63.)

Plaintiff's Proposed Third Amended Complaintcontains allegations that are virtually identical. (Motion, Ex. E, {f]

56, 64.)
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prejudiced by a lack of discovery should the amendment be allowed, is
unconvincing.
Accordingly, the Court finds the defense will not be impaired by the late
amendment.
4.3,

Laches and Movant's Reasons for Delay

The alleged breaches occurred in 2012.

This suit was brought in 2014.

Depositions where testimony was given suggesting the Reconciliation Agreement
was breached occurred in 2017 and 2018. There is clear evidence of delay in this
case. However, delay aloneis insufficient reason to bar a late-filed amendment.
Total Car Franchising, at p. 116.

Having determined Defendants will not be

prejudiced by the late-filed amendment, there is nothing for the Court to balance
underthe Total Car Franchising test. Id. at p. 114 (“‘a proposed amendmentwill not
be barred because it is offered late in the case so long as the other party is not
prejudiced”).
5. CONCLUSION
While the Court is mindful of Defendants’ frustration with Plaintiff's evolving
contract claims, the Court finds Plaintiff should be allowed leave to file his Third

Amended Complaint. While packaged in different ways, Plaintiff has made these
same or similar allegations of Defendants’ financial misconduct throughout the
litigation so that the defense of these claims will not be impeded by this late

amendmentto the pleadings. Further, any potential prejudice is minimizedas this
matter has yet to receive trial setting.

Finally, the Court finds permitting this

amendmentis consistent with the directive of O.C.G.A. § 9-11-15(a) that provides
leave to file pleading amendments after the entry of a pre-trial order “shall be freely
given” and is also in keeping with the “spirit of the Civil Practice Act which is to
ensure that cases be decided on their merits .. .” Id. at p. 116.
In light of the foregoing,it is hereby ORDEREDthatPlaintiff shall be granted
leave to file its Third Amended Complaint which shall be done promptly, no later
than two weeks after the entry of this order.
The Court will conduct a conference call with counsel on June 22, 2021 at

8:30 a.m. to discuss scheduling issues raised by this late-filed amendment — whether
Defendants anticipate any dispositive motions, trial setting,etc.

we

SO ORDEREDthis {7 day of June, 2021.

betty, Pa.Lae

JUDGKKELLY LEE ELLERBE
wok Court of Fulton County

Metro Atlanta Business Case Division
Atlanta Judicial Circuit
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